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
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AGDA (M) (4 Nov 59)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

19
FOR UT-UT-693246

10 November 1969

20

SUBJECT:

Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Battalion,
506th Infantry, ~~Regiment~~ ~~Brigade~~ ~~Division~~ ~~Corps~~

(U) H 8

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BATTALION (AIRBORNE) 506TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96317

AVDG-AF-O

18 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3d Battalion (Abn), 506th Infantry for the Period Ending 31 July 1969.

TO: See Distribution:

1. Section 1. Operational Significant Activities.

a. Elements of the 3d Battalion (Abn) 506th Infantry were involved in combat, combined, and pacification operations during the reporting period.

b. Task Force 3-506 participated in the following operations during the reporting period:

(1) Pacification and Pair-Off Operations (Unnamed): 1 May - 31 July 1969

(2) Small Unit Operations (Unnamed): 1 July - 31 July 1969

(3) Combined US-ARVN Pair-Off Operations (COBRA Teams): 1 May - 31 July 1969

c. Mission:

(1) Conduct search and destroy/reconnaissance-in-force operations against VC/NVA forces in Binh Thuan Province.

(2) Conduct pacification operations in Thien Giao District.

(3) Support Revolutionary Development within the assigned AO in conjunction with Binh Thuan Province.

(4) Conduct combined operations with the 44th ARVN Regiment and RF/PP companies in and around Thien Giao District.

d. Location: Binh Thuan Province.

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DDO DIR 5300.30

e. Reporting Officer: LTC James M. Bower

f. Task Organization: Inclosure # 1

g. After Action Report on Pacification: Inclosure # 2

h. Significant Activities:

(1) Pacification and Pair-Off operations continued throughout the reporting period.

(2) Task Force 3-506 conducted small unit operations in the Binh Thuan Province from 1 May to 31 July 1969.

2. Significant Activities:

a. On 1 May at 1720H vicinity, BDO14272, 3/B/3-506 Infantry and Prov Plat 1-69th -men engaged 15 VC at 75 meters. Artillery was employed in support. Forces were friendly-1 WI; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. On 2 May, at 1500H, vicinity 7-622307, the 2/B/3-506 Infantry found a bunker complex consisting of 11 bunkers 5' x 8' x 5' with 3' of overhead cover, 2 hootches, 10' x 12' x 8', 1 table and chair, and an animal cage. An air strike was employed, destroying 4 bunkers and 2 hootches, and damaging 3 other bunkers. On 13 May, COBRA Team 53 found 10 bunkers 3' x 4' x 10', with 2' of overhead cover, while sweeping an area vicinity 4D969377. At 1200H 14 May, vicinity ABM70365, Recon Team 53 found FOR OT UT 693246

Inclosure

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18 August 1962

AUTD-AF-0
SUBJECT: Operational Report
Ending 3 July 1962

th Infantry, for Period

three 105mm rounds and 3 bunkers 10' x 4' x 4' with 2' overhead cover. The 105mm rounds had been booby trapped and were destroyed along with the bunkers. At 1715H, 5/7/62 our spotted and engaged 5 VC vicinity AN936247. The 3/8/3-506 Infantry was inserted at the contact area. While conducting a sweep they engaged and killed 1 VC. Continuing the sweep, they found 5 more VC KIA which had been killed by the Day, 1 SKS, 1 transistor radio, 6 rucksacks, 4 pistol belts, with cartridges and cups, cooking utensils, medical supplies and some documents. At 1800H, vicinity AN970363, Recon Team 53 spotted 1 VC platoon moving to the east. Artillery and gunships were employed in support. The gunships received ground fire sustaining several hits. There were no friendly casualties while 1 VC was KIA. On 14 May, at 0730H, vicinity AN831201, 1/1/A/3-506 Infantry and 1 squad from the 300th RF Company, made contact with an estimated 15 VC. Artillery and gunships were employed in support. Results were: Friendly - 1 VC KIA; Enemy - 5 VC KIA. The kills were accredited as follows: 2 - 3-506th Infantry, and 3 - 192d Assault Helicopter Company. 1 AK47 was CIA and 1 B-40 rocket launcher was destroyed. At 1215H, vicinity AN83266, 2/4/3-506 Infantry, while on a cloverleaf operation, captured 2 VC, 1 PPS 54 Chicom SMG, one 7.62 Chicom pistol, 2 rucksacks, 1 Chinese flag, and scattered documents. They were extracted to LZ Betty for interrogation. On 15 May, at 0055H, vicinity AN804045, LZ Betty received an estimated fifteen 82mm mortar rounds. Counter mortar and artillery fire was fired in support. Results were: Friendly - 2 KIA and 2 WIA; Enemy - unknown. On 17 May, at 1930H, vicinity AN769154, COBRA Team 51, 1-506 Infantry made contact with an estimated VC company. The VC attacked with B-40 rockets, grenades, and automatic weapons. The COBRA Team employed automatic weapons, claymore mines, gunships, and artillery. COBRA Team 51 was extracted to LZ Betty at 2115H. Results were: Friendly - 3 US WIA, 3 VN WIA; Enemy - unknown. On 19 May, at 0615H vicinity AN937160, 1/8/3-506 Infantry found 10 bunkers 3' x 5' x 10' with overhead cover, 1 45 claymore mine, and 1 Chicom grenade. All was destroyed. At 1200H, vicinity AN945245, COBRA Team 55 engaged 12 VC with small arms fire. VC returned fire and fled to the north. Results were: Friendly - 1 WIA; Enemy - 2 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's and assorted documents CIA. On 22 May, at 1250H, vicinity AN735285, 1/8/3-506 engaged 15 - 20 VC with small arms fire. Artillery was employed in support. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 6 VC KIA and 1 AK47 CIA. On 25 May, 2140H, vicinity AN96224, while in night defensive position, 3/A/3-506 engaged 2 VC with small arms and claymore mines. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 SKS CIA. On 30 May, at 2110H, vicinity AN9C2167, 1/C/3-506, while in their night defensive position, received small arms fire and B-40 rockets from an estimated 4 VC. Fire was returned with small arms and M79 grenade launchers with two 81mm mortars firing illumination in support. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA.

b. On 2 June, at 1820H, vicinity AN835223, 2/A/3-506 Infantry, engaged 4 VC with small arms fire. Results were: 2 VC KIA and 1 rucksack, 2 sets LSS, 2 knives and assorted documents CIA. On 3 June, at 0035H, vicinity AN 902167, 1/C/3-506 Infantry, in their night defensive position, received an estimated twelve 82mm mortar rounds. Counter mortar and artillery was fired in support. Results were: Friendly - 2 WIA (US), 1 VN WIA; Enemy - unknown. On 5 June, at 1500H, vicinity AN954453, Recon Team 45, 3-506 Inf., engaged 3 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. On 6 June, at 0140H, vicinity AN998174, 1/C/3-506, in their night defensive position, received an estimated five 82mm mortar rounds, B-40 rockets, hand grenades and small arms fire. The company returned fire also employing artillery and gunships. Results were: Friendly - 1 US KIA, 1 VN RF WIA, 2 US WIA, 7 VN WIA; Enemy - 3 VC KIA, 3 suspects detained, and 1 B-40 rocket launcher, 14 Chicom grenades and 4 B-40 rockets CIA. On 6 June, at 0430H, vicinity AN99207, 1/C/3-506, in their night defensive position, engaged an estimated VC armed with claymore mines, and M-79 fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and assorted documents CIA. On 6 June, at 0605H, vicinity AN805069, LZ Betty received an estimated six to eight 107mm rocket rounds. Counter mortar and artillery fire was employed in support. Results were: Friendly - 3 KIA, 5 WIA and 1 OIF-AF aircraft, 1 building, 1 3/4 ton truck, 1 PRC 47 radio, 1 KN26 Radio, 1 NO28 Generator and 3 sets binoculars destroyed while 3 buildings were damaged. At 1000H, vicinity AN771-096 234th RF Company, while conducting a sweep of a suspected VC mortar position.

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AUOC-IP-0

18 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Leader Board, A/C Association (ABN), 506th Infantry for the period ending 31 July 1969.

found 2 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's. On 8 June, at 2100H, vicinity AN881217, 2/A/2-506th Infantry engaged 1 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. At 2300H, vicinity AN895177, 1/C/3-506th Infantry, in their night defensive position, engaged 5 - 10 VC with claymore mines and hand grenades. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. At 2325H, vicinity AN895177, 1/C/3-506th Infantry in their night defensive position, received hand grenades and small arms fire from 8 - 10 VC. 81mm mortar fired illumination in support. Results were: Friendly - 1 VN WIA; Enemy - unknown. On 9 June, at 0205H, vicinity AN904207, C/P/D/3-506th Infantry in night defensive position, engaged 2 VC with claymore mines. The VC returned fire with small arms and 7 rounds of 60mm mortar. 81mm mortar HE, and illumination were fired in support of US Troops. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. At 0700H, vicinity AN895177, 1/C/3-506th Infantry, while conducting a sweep of the previous night's contact area, found 1 AK-47, 3 C-40 grenades, 1 B-40 rocket booster, 1 rucksack, and some food and clothing. On 13 June, at 1905H, vicinity AN897178, 2/B/3-506, while in an ambush position, received small arms fire from the 164 RF Co resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 VN Interpreter KIA and 1 K.I. Carson Scout WIA. On 14 June, at 1020H, vicinity AN941463, Recon Team 46, 3-506th Infantry, engaged 3 VC with claymore mines. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 3 VC KIA and 2 SWS's, 1 M-1 Rifle, 200 rounds AK ammunition, 1 rucksack with cooking utensils, 2 pistol belts with canteens and cups and assorted documents CIA. At 2030H, vicinity AN866220, 3/2/A/3-506th Infantry in their night defensive position, made contact with an estimated 15 VC employing small arms, M-79 and 82mm mortar. Results were: 3 US WIA, 3 VN WIA; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. On 16 June, at 1130H, vicinity AN932230, 1/D/3-506th Infantry, engaged 4 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA, 1 VC suspect detained, and 1 guitar, cooking utensils, and assorted documents CIA. Art. found in the area were 15 bunkers with sleeping positions which were destroyed. At 1625H, vicinity AN933230, a helicopter from the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company received ground fire from an unknown size force. The command and control helicopter, 3-506th Infantry, while checking out the contact area, also received ground fire. Results: 2 US slightly WIA; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. On 18 June, at 0115H, vicinity AN792067, LZ Betty CP received an estimated twenty-two 82mm mortar rounds. Counter mortar and artillery fire was fired in support. Results were: Friendly - 1 3/4 ton truck and 1 water trailer destroyed, and 2 buildings damaged; Enemy - unknown. On 20 June, vicinity AN931132, 1/B/3-506 Infantry found 10 bunkers 4' x 4' x 6', with two feet of overhead cover. The bunkers contained cooking utensils, and assorted ammunition which was destroyed. At 2130H, vicinity AN931147, 1/B/3-506th Infantry in their night defensive positions, engaged 2 VC with claymore mines. Results were: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 2 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. On 21 June, at 1100H, vicinity AN891177, 3/B/3-506th Infantry found a bunker complex containing 1 rucksack, clothing, cooking utensils, medical supplies, 50 pounds of rice and assorted documents. All but the documents were destroyed. At 1330H, vicinity AN917137, 1/B/3-506 found 6' x 6' bunker containing 2 Bangalore torpedoes, 1 CS and 1 WP grenade, cooking utensils, 1 canteen. All was destroyed. On 23 June, at 2245H, vicinity AN77724, 2/B/3-506th Infantry, in their night defensive position, received small arms and M-79 grenade launcher fire from an estimated 4 VC. The unit returned fire with small arms and artillery. Results were: Friendly - 1 WIA; Enemy - unknown. On 30 June, at 0930H, vicinity AN881227, 1/A/3-506th Infantry, received sniper fire. Artillery was employed in support. Results were: Friendly - 1 WIA; Enemy - unknown.

c. On 2 July, at 0600H, vicinity AN939138, 3/B/3-506 Infantry found 3 graves containing 3 VC killed by small arms fire. The graves were estimated to be 1 month old. At 1100H, vicinity AN895385, 1/C/3-506th Infantry, detonated a booby trapped VC claymore mine. Results: 5 friendly WIA; Enemy - unknown. On 4 July, at 0930H, vicinity AN839219, 2/A/3-506th Infantry, while on a sweep, activated an unknown type booby trap. Results: Friendly - 3 WIA; Enemy - unknown. On 5 July, at 1510H, vicinity AN895363, 1/C/3-506 found one 102mm howitzer tube and breech block. Both were destroyed. On 6 July, at 1835H, vicinity AN934137, 1/B/3-506th Infantry found 1 grave containing 1 VC KIA. The body was estimated to be 10 days old. On 7 July, at 0245H, vicinity AN930235, 1/B/3-506th Infantry, engaged an estimated VC squad with small arms and M-79 fire. Results were: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 3 VC KIA and 1

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ADBU-JF-C

13 August 1969

SUL-T-Off: Operational Report - Task Force Charlie, 11 Battalion (13A) 506th Infantry for the Period Ending 31 July 1969.

Russian Sniper Rifle, with scope, 2 sets of LBE and assorted documents CIA. On 10 July, at 0310H, vicinity AN853182, 1/C/3-506th Infantry, in their night defensive position, received small arms fire, 1 B-40 rocket, and 3 mortar rounds of unknown type. Small arms and 81mm mortar fire was employed. Results were: Friendly - 1 KIA, 3 WIA; Enemy - unknown. 1 M-16 Rifle MIA. On 11 July, at 2140H, vicinity AN867215, 2/2/3-506th Infantry, in their night defensive position, received small arms and automatic weapons fire and 1 B-40 rocket round. Results were: Friendly - 2 VN males KIA, 3 VN female WIA; Enemy - unknown. One medical supply bag with blood on it and 1 VC scarf with emblem CIA. On 13 July, at 1645H, vicinity AN815245, 2/4/3-506th Infantry, engaged 4 VC with small arms fire. 2/1 Cav gunships were employed in support. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 3 VC KIA (2/1 Cav credited for 1 VC KIA) and 1 AK-47, 1 M-2 carbine, one .45 cal pistol, 1 B-40 rocket launcher with 2 rounds, 4 Chicom grenades, assorted documents and medical supplies CIA. At 1802H, vicinity AN338228, 1/4/3-506th Infantry activated a booby trapped 175mm round resulting in 1 US KIA and 7 US WIA. At 1915H vicinity AN839230, 2/4/3-506th Infantry, activated an unknown type booby trap resulting in 1 US WIA. At 2357H, vicinity AN864187, 2/3/3-506th Infantry, received small arms fire and an estimated 2 B-40 rockets. Small arms and 81mm mortar fire was employed. Results were: Friendly - 2 WIA (Slight); Enemy - unknown. On 14 July, at 1635H, vicinity AN829240, CP/1/4/3-506th Infantry, engaged 3 VC with small arms fire. US artillery was fired in support. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 and 1 set of LBE CIA. On 17 July, at 0720H, vicinity AN854181, CP/C/3/3-506th Infantry, while on a sweep operation, found 1 VC killed by mortar fire. On 18 July, at 0733H, vicinity BN045312, COBRA Team 35 sighted and engaged 4 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 2 VC KIA and 1 M-1 Carbine and 4 rucksacks with 7 gallons of water in each CIA. At 0955 H, vicinity BN003245, 1/B/3-506th Infantry, received three 60mm mortar rounds. Results were: Friendly - 1 KIA, 2 WIA; Enemy - Unknown. At 2300H, vicinity AN854190, 1/C/3-506th Infantry, while in their night defensive position, received small arms fire and 4 B-40 rocket rounds from an estimated VC squad. Artillery and gunships were employed in support. Results were: Friendly - 1 RF WIA; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 B-40 rocket, 1 AK-47 magazine with ammunition, 4 Chicom grenades and 1 pistol belt CIA. On 21 July, at 1400H, vicinity BN060202, 4/3-506th Infantry, found a base camp containing papers, 55-gallon drums, books on tactics, tools, pots, and pans, 7 to 10 chickens, 55 lizards, and approximately 3,000 punji stakes. All but the books and papers were destroyed. At 1625H, vicinity BN066235, COBRA Team 33 sighted 6 VC. 2/1 Cav gunships were employed in support. Results were: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. On 24 July, at 1200H, vicinity BN04119X, 1/C/4/3-506th Infantry, engaged 2 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA, and 1 poncho, 1 US poncho liner, 1 notebook, documents, 1 M-2 Carbine, and 2 magazines CIA. At 1500H, vicinity BN034204, 1/4/3-506th Infantry, engaged 3 VC women in a camp site. The women fled. A search of the camp site revealed 1 dog, 10 pounds of rice, 5 pounds of salt and some cooking utensils. All was destroyed. On 28 July, at 1435H, vicinity ZS278963, 2/2/3-506th Infantry, engaged 2 women with small arms fire. A sweep of the area revealed 5 bunkers and a wounded 16-year-old girl, who was unconscious, and Medevac'd to LZ Betty. Found in the camp were: 1 MVA LBE, 9 sets of clothes, 10 gallons of water, 5 rucksacks, and some hammocks. All was destroyed except the LBE and rucksacks which were returned to LZ Betty. On 29 July, at 1600H, vicinity BN122270, CP/2/B/3-506th Infantry, engaged 6 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 SBS with 100 rounds of ammunition, 10 rounds M-1 ammunition, 1 rucksack, and assorted documents CIA. Overall results for this reporting period were:

A. PERSONNEL (Friendly):

7 KIA; 46 WIA (16 Medevac, 3C Minor)

B. PERSONNEL (Enemy):

- (1) 62 KIA VC/KVA
- (2) 7 POW VC/WIA
- (3) 0 Noi Chomps
- (4) 123 Detained

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12 August 1969

A/VEO-MP-0
SUBJECT: Operational Report, 3d Battalion (3Bn) 534th Infantry, for Period Ending 31 July 1969.

1. CAPTURED:

- (1) 26 small arms
- (2) 2 B-40 Rocket Launchers
- (3) 13 Pick sacks
- (4) 3 Pocadore torpedoes
- (5) 1 ton of rice
- (6) 710 small arms rounds
- (7) 7 Grenades

2. DESTROYED:

- 2 - .50mm mortar rounds
- 1 - 105 Howitzer tube and block

3. Intelligence Summary:

a. Enemy Disposition: During the reporting period Military Region 6 Headquarters elements remained in the vicinity of the Binh Thuy, Lam Dong, Binh Thuan Borders. The 482 LF Bn remained in its normal operational area in the vicinity of Lo To Mountain (vic AN7526) throughout the period. The 840 MF Bn spent most of the period north of Song Mao between Nhieu Ca Tang (BN2453) and Lao Tri (BN4150). The 186 MF Bn was reported to be operating primarily in the Le Hong Phong (vic BN1030) and at times moved north of Qui Nhon (BN0948). The 240 NVA Bn remains widely dispersed and has not been identified at one specific location. It is believed, based on agent reports, that some elements of this battalion moved back into the province and are operating north of Thien Giao District. The Local Force Companies and the Village Guerrilla Units remained in their normal operating areas with no significant change in operations, strength, or equipment.

b. Enemy Disposition at the End of Reporting Period:

482 LF Bn	VIC ET 2632
840 MF Bn	VIC BN 4248
186 MF Bn	VIC BN 0948
240 NVA Bn	VIC BN 2952
481 LF Bn	
C-1	VIC ET 2701
C-2	VIC PC 4919
C-3	VIC AM 5347
480 LF Co	VIC 4F 8079
480 LF Co	VIC AK 9722

4. Enemy Activities:

a. During the period there were few contacts where units were identified.

b. Elements of the 186 MF Bn were identified in contact along QL1 (vic AN9063) on 17 June. The contact was in the form of an enemy initiated ambush involving 2/1/Cav. The tactics used were typical of those used previously by the 186 MF Bn. A 2nd Class who rallied after the contact identified the unit in the contact to be the 186 MF Bn supported by elements of the 240 NVA Bn.

c. All other identifiable contacts were with LF elements indicating that the Main Force elements remained in their base camp areas rebuilding and resupplying.

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12 August 1969

AVTGM/P-0
SUBJECT: Operational Report, 02 Battalion (Amm) 503rd Infantry, for Period Ending 31 July 1969.

1. CAPTURED:

- (1) 26 small arms
- (2) 2 B-40 Rocket Launchers
- (3) 13 Pick sacks
- (4) 3 Pindalore torpedoes
- (5) 1 ton of rice
- (6) 710 small arms rounds
- (7) 7 Grenades

2. DESTROYED:

- 2 - .50mm mortar rounds
- 1 - 105 Howitzer tube and block

3. Intelligence Summary:

a. Enemy Disposition: During the reporting period Military Region 6 Headquarters elements remained in the vicinity of the Binh Thuy, Lam Dong, Binh Thuan Borders. The 482 LF Bn remained in its normal operational area in the vicinity of Lo To Mountain (vic AN7526) throughout the period. The 840 MF Bn spent most of the period north of Song Mao between Mai Ca Tang (BN2453) and Lac Tri (BN4150). The 186 MF Bn was reported to be operating primarily in the Le Hong Phong (vic BN1030) and at times moved north of Qui (BN0948). The 240 NVA Bn remained widely dispersed and has not been identified at one specific location. It is believed, based on agent reports, that some elements of this battalion moved back into the province and are operating north of Thien Giao District. The Local Force Companies and the Village Guerrilla Units remained in their normal operating areas with no significant change in operations, strength, or equipment.

b. Enemy Disposition at the End of Reporting Period:

482 LF Bn	VIC ZT 2632
840 MF Bn	VIC BN 4248
186 MF Bn	VIC BN 0948
240 NVA Bn	VIC BN 2952
481 LF Bn	
C-1	VIC ZT 2701
C-2	VIC ZC 1919
C-3	VIC AK 537
480 LF Co	VIC ZB 8079
480 LF Co	VIC AK 9722

4. Enemy Activities:

a. During the period there were few contacts where units were identified.

b. Elements of the 186 MF Bn were identified in contact along Qui (vic AN7523) on 17 June. The contact was in the form of an enemy initiated ambush involving 2/1/Cav. The tactics used were typical of those used previously by the 186 MF Bn. A Boi Chanh who rallied after the contact identified the unit in the contact to be the 186 MF Bn supported by elements of the 240 NVA Bn.

c. All other identifiable contacts were with LF elements indicating that the Main Force elements remained in their base camp areas rebuilding and resupplying.

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AVTGA-3-2

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Infantry Battalion 3-506, 508th Infantry Reg. Period Ending 31 July 1969.

18 August 1969

5. Significant Intelligence Activity:

a. During the month of May, June and July contact with enemy forces was light. Enemy units in the Task Force 3-506 withdrew to secret base camps in mountain areas to recover from losses suffered during the Tet Offensive in February. Readout from documents and interrogation of POW's and Hoi Chanks indicate that enemy units have been directed by MR-6 to break-down into squad size elements for the purpose of conducting harassing attacks against US/VN outposts and pacified areas. During the reporting period few confirmed contacts with Main Force units were made.

b. During the month of May, TF 3-506 experienced light contact with the enemy.

c. During the month of June, TF 3-506 continued operations primarily concerned with pacification. As a result, fewer contacts were made with the enemy; however, intelligence sources indicated the VC were having an increasingly difficult task of obtaining food and supplies. Joint US/VN operations resulted in considerable disruption of the VC Infrastructure through the use of cordon and search operations.

d. The month of July was the most active period with respect to VC attacks. Sappers were very active during this period although no units of the 3-506th Infantry, were attacked. Standoff mortar attacks increased sharply during this period. As of 13 July pacification by US forces in Binh Thuan Province was de-emphasized. More US offensive operations were conducted to increase pressure on enemy forces in outlying areas, thereby relieving the population centers of enemy pressure. The effects of these operations were notable as standoff attacks ceased. The VC offensive, anticipated to occur around 20 July, did not materialize. During the month of July sizeable amounts of rice and food supplies were captured and/or destroyed. Hoi Chanks reported the VC to be suffering from lack of food supplies. There was also a marked increase in the number of Hoi Chanks who rallied during this period.

Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations: Operating with smaller than platoon size elements.

1. **OBSERVATION:** Personnel should be broken down into units smaller than platoon size when operating in the lowlands of Binh Thuan Province.

2. **EVALUATION:** During the month of July the platoons of the 3-506 Infantry were employed differently than they had been in the past. Little contact was made during the reporting period using company and platoon size elements. The VC can detect the movement of large elements and would hide or just move out of the path of the approaching units. It was decided to use smaller than platoon-size elements for concerted ambush operations. The platoons in the battalion were divided into two elements and each of the elements remained sufficiently close to aid one another if a major contact developed. Since operating in this new configuration, the platoons have succeeded in sighting and engaging many more VC elements than in the past. By going into this type of operation, it is felt the battalion is keeping the VC on the run by thoroughly covering a larger area.

3. **RECOMMENDATION:** That if the VC do not intend to operate in large forces but remain in from 3-to 10-man elements, it is much more effective to operate in smaller than platoon size forces; however, it must be emphasized that each element must be capable of moving to the support of the other if needed.

c. Training: Sniper Training within Separate Battalions.

1. **OBSERVATION:** There should be a Sniper Training Program within the

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A700-AF-C
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3d Battalion (Abn) 506th
Infantry for the Period Ending 31 July 1969.

16 August 1969

3-506 Infantry in order to attain and maintain the number of qualified snipers that are needed in the battalion.

2. EVALUATION: It has been found that the number of allocations given to the 3-506 Infantry to send qualified marksmen to a Sniper Training School is not sufficient to meet the demands of the battalion. A large part of the battalion AO is made up of terrain and vegetation that permits snipers to be very effectively utilized. It is also anticipated that by employing school-trained snipers as instructors, a very effective and efficient Sniper Training Program can be set up within the battalion. This battalion is currently in the process of setting up such a program. At present the battalion, utilizing all quotas allocated, has only nine qualified snipers. The battalion is authorized 24 snipers, but to provide depth it intends to train and maintain a minimum of 30 snipers. Two snipers in each rifle platoon, six in the Reconnaissance Platoon, and six in reserve to be used when the tactical situation requires more snipers to be employed.

3. RECOMMENDATION: That separate battalions which, because of the separate status, location, or mission, do not have the opportunity to send qualified personnel to a Sniper Training School, establish a school within their battalion, utilizing school trained snipers as instructors.

- d. Intelligence: None
- e. Logistics: None
- f. Organization: None
- g. Other: None

James M. Bowers

JAMES M. BOWERS
LTC, Infantry
Commanding

2 Incl
1-Task Force Organization
2- Combat After Action Report
 Pacification & Fair-Off
 Operations

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AVFA-GC-HIST (18 Aug 69) 1st Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3d Battalion (Abn), 506th
Infantry for the Period Ending 31 July 1969

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 12 AUG 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and concurs.

2. (C) The following comments are submitted:

a. Reference para 3b: This headquarters held the following locations
for indicated units as of 31 July 69:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u>
482A LF Bn	AN7422
482 LF Bn	ZT1113
840 MF Bn	BN3848
186 MF Bn	BN0936
240 NVA Bn	AN9624
481 LF Bn	ZT1514
C-1	ZT2007
480 LF Co	ZT9520
430 LF Co	BN1620

b. Reference Section II para C1: Concur with evaluation in that
3/506th Inf received only 2 quotas per month for sniper training with
the 9th Inf Div prior to its re-deployment. Arrangements have been made
for the 3/506th Inf to resume sniper training with the 101st Abn Div.
Concur with the recommendation that battalion level sniper training be
conducted. Reports received by this headquarters from 3/506th Inf
indicate that the unit is presently short some items of sniper equipment
but requisitions were submitted on 8 July 69. Upon receipt of this
equipment sniper training conducted by the battalion will be possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Fredrick E. Holland
FREDRICK E. HOLLAND
1LT AGO,
ASST AG

Copy Furn:
1 - TF South
1 - 3/506th Inf
2 - AGSFOR, DA

8

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AVHGC-DST (18 Aug 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 3d Battalion (Abn), 506th Infantry for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 5 OCT 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 3d Battalion, (Airborne) 506th Infantry.

2. (C) Reference item concerning "Sniper Training within Separate Battalions", section II, page 6, paragraph 2c; nonconcur. The establishment of an effective sniper program is dependent on qualified sniper instructors, adequate training facilities, and an expert gunsmith. The expense incurred in the procurement of sniper weapons and the shortage of qualified instructors will not permit the establishment of a sniper school below division level. This headquarters has initiated a request to DA for the establishment of a sniper instructor training course to meet the growing requirements in Vietnam.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


C. O. WILSON
1LT, ACC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
3/506th Inf
I PPV

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GPOK-DT (18 Aug 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th
Infantry for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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SUBJECT: TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION

1. The Task Organization of Task Force 3-506th Infantry at the beginning of the reporting period was as shown below:

- a. HHC, 3-506th Infantry
- b. Co A, 3-506th Infantry
- c. Co B, 3-506th Infantry
- d. Co C, 3-506th Infantry
- e. Co D, 3-506th Infantry
- f. Co E, 3-506th Infantry
 - (1) Recon Platoon
 - (2) 4,2" Mortar Platoon
 - (3) 81mm Mortar Platoon
- g. 1 squad HHC, 326th Engineers (attached)
- h. Btry D, 2-320th Artillery

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DDO 002 5200.10

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ENCLOSURE 1

II

AVDO-AP-0

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

TO: Commanding General, IFORCEIV, APO 96350
Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division APO 96383
Commanding Officer, Task Force South, APO 96204
Deputy for Comds, IFORCEIV, APO 96350
Commanding Officer, MACV Advisory Team 37, APO 96317

1. Name and Identity and/or Type of Operations:
Pacification and Fair-off Operations.
2. Dates of Operation:
27 April 1969 thru 30 June 1969
3. Location of Operation:
Thien Giao District, Binh Thuan Province, RVN (AO SHERIDAN)
4. Command and Control Headquarters:
Task Force South
5. Reporting Officer:
LTC Manuel A. Alves, Commanding Officer, 3d Bn (Abn), 506th Inf (Airmobile)
6. Task Organization:
3d Bn (Abn), 506th Inf, 101st Abn Div
F-2/30th Artillery (D5)
Thien Giao Sub-sector
164 Regional Force Company
300 Regional Force Company
203 Regional Force Company
7. Supporting Forces:
C Btry, 5-22 Arty (GS)
B Btry, 5-27 Arty (GS)
A Btry, 5-27 Arty (GS)
USA F, TAC Air
192nd AH (-) (GS)
Binh Thuan Sector
Thien Giao MP/2 Plt
8th FECOFSE Bn
Vietnamese Information Service (VIS)
Vietnamese Psy-War
Binh Thuan Province National Ghieu Hoi Center
Revolutionary Development Cadre
8. Intelligence:
a. At the initiation of TF 3-506 pacification operations the enemy disposition within the TAOL was as follows:
 - (1) The 482 LF Bn had not been identified since contact vicinity AM 78/175 on Mar 69. A PV captured in this contact stated that the unit at that time consisted of 130 personnel due to heavy losses suffered in February. Elements of the 482 LF Bn continued to infiltrate the Triangle Area to receive supplies from VCI and guerrilla elements operating along Highway 53. Information was also obtained from several Hoi Chungs who rallied from local guerrilla elements to the NVN in order to avoid induction into the 482 LF Bn.
 - (2) The 430 LF Co continued to operate vicinity AM 8319 with an estimated strength of 30 personnel. The 430 LF Co identified on 14 May 69 as a combined ambush position of A Co, 3-506th Infantry and the 300 LF Co engaged elements of the LF Co which were acting as security for a propaganda element operating in the vicinity of Phu Lam (H), vicinity AM 8618.

CONFIDENTIAL**SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report**

(3) The 450 LF Co, with an estimated strength of 35 personnel, initially operated in the northern section of the Le Hong Phong, vicinity AN 9024; however, once pacification efforts were directed against Tuy Hoa (V), vicinity AN 9017, the unit deployed into the southern portion of the Le Hong Phong, vicinity AN 9315. In conjunction with local guerrilla elements, the 450 LF Co continually harassed friendly elements in Tuy Hoa and Hoa Vinh Villages. In the early morning hours of 6 June 69 the 450 LF Co divided its two platoons with one entering Hoa Vinh (V), vicinity AN 905205, and the other entering Tuy Hoa (V). Both VC elements were engaged by friendly ambush positions. Documents taken off of VC KIA identified the 450 LF Co in both instances.

(4) In the vicinity of Tien Giao District HQs, the most active guerrilla element throughout the reporting period was the Ham Phu (V) guerrillas with a reported strength of 26 personnel. Along Hwy 8B, the Nam Chinh (V) guerrillas, and associated VC cadre, continued to be the main suppliers for the 462 LF BN and the 430 LF Co. The guerrilla platoon of Ham Chinh was estimated at 42 strong with the VC active elements estimated at 60 personnel. Various hamlet Arrow Action Teams operated throughout the pacification area of operations with an average team strength of 10 personnel. Primarily a propaganda arm, the AATs were virtually eliminated within Phase I hamlets of the Province RD program as the basic necessity to operate overtly was denied to them by combined ambush positions within and around the target areas.

b. Cordon and search operations which were conducted initially within the target areas were aimed at eliminating VC. Coordination was conducted daily with Tien Giao DIOCC by means of the 3-506 MI Det which was attached to the Battalion Light CP located at Tien Giao District HQs. Jointly produced blacklists resulted in the capture of 9 VC while actual combat operations resulted in the identification of 3 VC KIA from Tuy Hoa (V). The Voluntary Informant Program produced no significant results during Phase I. This lack of success was basically due to the fact that 70 sympathizers created fear among the populace by threatening any individual who gave information to the US or RF soldiers.

c. Documents taken from 3 VC KIA by Reconnaissance Team b6, vicinity AN 901162, on 14 Jun 69, correlated with documents captured by 1/2/1 Co, on 12 Jun 69, and indicated a mission statement for the enemy elements within Binh Thuan Province. This mission called for closer coordination between Main Forces, Local Forces, and guerrilla elements, along with the initiation of "guerrilla warfare" against RVN pacification efforts. It appeared that the enemy Main Force element had broken up into small elements to operate with Local Force Companies. As Phase I of Pacification Operations came to a close it was obvious that the enemy had broken up into mostly platoon size elements to conduct harassing activities while selectively choosing his targets for large scale assaults.

9. Mission:

The mission of TF 3-506 was to support the Revolutionary Development Program of Binh Thuan Province.

10. Concept of Operations:

TF 3-506 pacification operations employed the dual concept of securing the populace within the target hamlets while upgrading the RF/PF elements by conducting small unit pair-off operations in and around the hamlets. Initially a target hamlet would be subjected to a cordon and search operation, with US and RF units cordoning the hamlet, while the Tien Giao National Police Field Force (NPF) platoon and Police Special Branch (PSB) personnel searched the hamlet and questioned the people. ARVN and US Psychological Warfare Teams, Chieu Hoi Teams, and Medicap Teams would then operate within the hamlet continuously. Once it was deemed appropriate the cordon would be withdrawn and pair-off operations would commence. This concept called for RF/US squad for squad and platoon for platoon ambushes and screening operations, consisting of combined ambush positions within and on the periphery of the hamlets. Once satisfactory results had been achieved by this type of operation and consolidation of the hamlets defenses had been accomplished, the final stage of direct protection within the hamlet was left solely to the RF/PF elements with US elements then being able to conduct screening operations along the VC infiltration routes outside of the hamlets.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operation Advisor Action Report

Thus with direct and indirect security was provided to the people within the hamlets along with the RD cadre who would then be able to operate on a 24 hour basis.

11. Execution:

On 27 Apr 69, A Company (A), TF 3-506 was inserted into Thien Giao District, Tru Hung Village, vicinity AN 86227, to commence combined pacification operations with the 300 RF Company. The A Company CP was established with the 300 RF Company CP in an outpost centered within Tru Hung (V). Ambush positions were immediately established with one US squad and one RF squad. On 30 Apr 69, a conference at Binh Thuan Province Headquarters was held for the purpose of coordinating pacification operations, to determine target villages and hamlets, and to establish areas of operation. Attendees at this conference were:

CO, 23 Infantry Division (ARVN)
CO, Task Force South
CO, Task Force 3-506
S4, 23 Infantry Division (ARVN)
Province Chief, Binh Thuan Province
SI, Binh Thuan Province
CO, 14th ARVN Regiment
SA, 14th ARVN Regiment

It was decided that TF 3-506 would establish a Light Command Post at Thien Giao District Headquarters. Priority for TF 3-506 pacification efforts were Hoa Ten (H), vicinity AN 900170, and Hoa Dong (H), vicinity AN 900175. Prior coordination with the Thien Giao District Chief and Senior District Advisor by CO, TF 3-506 resulted in pacification operations directed against the following hamlets:

Tan Hung (1)	AN875217
Tan Hung (2)	AN880217
An Phu	AN866215
Van Giao	AN867230
Tan Thanh	AN868245
Lam Hoa	AN871260

It was mutually agreed on 30 Apr 69, that the Binh Thuan Province Chief would relocate the following units to the direct command of the Thien Giao District Chief:

510 RF Company
808 RF Company
283 RF Company
164 RF Company
370 RF Company
764 RF Company

An order published on 7 May 69 by Province Headquarters directed pacification operations in the hamlets of Hoa Dien (AN896220), Hoa Thanh (AN905205), and Binh Lam (AN861185). Although these target areas had not been previously coordinated and agreed upon, TF 3-506 integrated Hoa Dien and Hoa Thanh Hamlets into Phase I pacification efforts. Due to the lack of available forces and the slow progress of RF elements, the hamlet of Binh Lam was postponed until Phase II.

a. TF 3-506 displaced a Light CP to Thien Giao District Headquarters on May 69 to assist pacification operations and coordinate with ARVN District officials and US advisors. On 2 May 69, two 82mm mortars and crews were attached to Company 4, to provide fire support and illumination for combined ambushes.

b. On 050000H May 1969, Companies B and C, TF 3-506 commenced a combined operation with the 283 and 164 RF Companies by conducting a cordon and search of Tru Soc Village (Hoa Ten & Hoa Dong Hamlets). Twenty-seven VC suspects were detained by PSM from Thien Giao. Four of these suspects were classified as active VC sympathizers. Medical, Civic Action, and psychological operations were conducted in conjunction with the cordon and search operations.

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SOUTHERN: Continued Operation After Action Report

The cordon around Tuy Hoa (V) was maintained for three days with the RD cadre of RD Teams 4 and 14 co-looting with the CP of Company C nightly. On 7 May 69, 4 Hoi Chanks rallied at RF outpost NORA, vicinity AN 960300. Upon interrogation the Hoi Chanks stated that they had attempted to rally at Tuy Hoa (V), but were afraid to do so when they observed the US forces around their native village. On 8 May 69, two Hoi Chanks who rallied two weeks ago were inserted with Company C. One of two Hoi Chanks led the 1st platoon of Company C to a house containing a false wall which concealed VC documents and a CHINCOM grenade. In addition, the Hoi Chanks pointed out the infiltration route into the village and the homes and relatives of active VC. Once the cordon was withdrawn, Company C linked with the 164 RF Company and began ambush operation in and around the village. Company B and 283 RF Company conducted screening operations to the east of the village i the Lo Hong Phong Forest in an effort to intercept VC penetration attempts. On 10 May 69, two 82mm mortars and crews were inserted into Tuy Hoa (V) to support Companies B and C, TF 3-506, and the 164 and 283 RF Companies.

c. At 140730H May 69, vicinity AN 031201, 1/1/A/3-506 and 1 squad from the 300 RF Company engaged an estimated VC platoon. Artillery and 192d ABG gunships supported the contact which was broken at 0335 hours. Results were 1 RF KIA, 5 VC KIA, 1 AK-47 rifle captured, and 1 B-40 rocket launcher destroyed. At 141215H May 69, vicinity AN 033200, 2/A/3-506 operating independently to the northwest of Thion Giao captured 2 VC, 1 PPS 13 SMG, one 7.62 CHINCOM pistol, and two rucksacks containing propaganda literature. Interrogation of the PWs revealed that they had participated in the contact with 1/A/3-506 earlier in the day which occurred after they had withdrawn from An Phu (H) where they had conducted a propaganda mission. On 20 May 69, Company D was inserted into the Tuy Hoa (V) area to replace Company B in its patroff operations with the 283 RF Company. At 232140H May 69, vicinity AN 090224, 3/A/3-506 while in its Night Defensive Position engaged 2 VC with small arms and claymores. The engagement resulted in negative friendly casualties and 1 VC KIA with 1 SKS captured.

d. At 040015H June 69, vicinity AN 906209, Company D (-) in conjunction with the 283 RF Co., 828 RF Companies, cordoned the hamlets of Hoa Thanh (1) and Hoa Thanh (2). During the initial stages of the cordon, elements from S-5, TF 3-506, the 8th PSKOPS Field Team and VIS conducted psychological operations. The cordon was maintained for three days, at which time Company D and the 283 RF Company then conducted combined operations within the two hamlets.

e. At 031015H June 69, vicinity AN 031223, 2/A/3-506 engaged 4 VC with small arms fire. Contact was broken at 1830 hours resulting in negative friendly casualties and 2 VC KIA. On 3 June 69, vicinity AN 902167, 1/0/3-506, in its NDP, received 12 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in 3 US WIA and 1 RF WIA. At 060115H June 69, vicinity AN 090174, Company C and the 164 RF Company confirmed CP received 5 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, 2 B-40 rockets, 12 hand grenades, and small arms fire. Contact was broken at 0300 hours. Results were 1 US KIA, 1 RF KIA, 2 US WIA, 1 RF WIA, while the enemy sustained 3 VC KIA, 1 B-40, 4 B-40 rockets and 16 CHINCOM grenades captured. At 060130H June 69, vicinity AN 090207, 1/D/3-506 engaged an estimated VC squad with claymores and M-79 fire resulting in 1 VC KIA. Documents captured in Company C and Company D contact on 6 June 69 identified the 450 LF Company. On 7 June 69, at 0215 hours, vicinity AN 902157, 1/D/3-506 received 11 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from the vicinity of Hoa Dian (H). This prompted a cordon operation around Hoa Dian (H) by elements of Company D who were assisted by a cushioned element from Company A and the 300 RF Company which were crest-assaulted into position on 12 June 69. At 0130 hours, 10 June 69, the unit was in place around Hoa Dian (H). Fourteen VC suspects were detained by Company D. Three VC were working out of Hoa Dian (H) due to the area and forced to operate in Tay Son (V) because of the presence of the presence of Company C, TF 3-506.

f. During the night of 29 May 69, the 7th blew up a culvert along Hwy 23, vicinity AN 061235. The culvert was 60% destroyed. At 010030H May 69, a hamlet dispensary was completely destroyed by satchel charges vicinity AN 060216. On 1 June 69, vicinity AN 060217, a hamlet schoolhouse was 75% destroyed by plastic explosives and satchel charges.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

These terrorist actions prompted the deployment of one platoon from Company A, TF 3-506 on 2 Jun 69. This platoon was divided into three squads with each squad operating in conjunction with the Popular Force (PF) platoons responsible for three separate hamlets along Hwy 8B. Two or three times nightly a US/PF element would patrol throughout the hamlet. Initially this tactic met with little enemy resistance other than sniper fire; however, on 14 Jun 69, at 2030 hours, vicinity AN 966220, one such combined patrol was engaged by an estimated 15 US resulting in 3 US KIA, 3 PF WIA, 1 M-2 carbine KIA, 1 VC KIA and M-1 captured. Since the combined patrol concept went into operation within the three hamlets, no other terrorist incidents or activity was noted during Phase I.

c. Enemy activity detected by combined US/RF and JS/PF elements primarily consisted of small scale actions with brief exchanges of fire. Sniper fire and enemy movement was a nightly occurrence throughout all three target areas. Psychological operations within the Phase I hamlets were directed to the mothers and wives of known VC as a means of inducing the relatives of the VC to convince the VC to rally to the GVN. Leaflet drops were made over the target hamlets emphasising the Voluntary Infiltration Program. RD cadre operations were directed at convincing the people that the GVN was in their hamlets to stay and that self-rule and self-determination by the people themselves would be guaranteed. This promise was delivered on the 12th and 15th of June 1969 when local hamlet and village elections were held within the target hamlets.

12. Results:

Friendly - US KIA 2
US WIA 7
RF KIA 3
RF WIA 12
PF KIA 0
PF WIA 3

Enemy - VC KIA 29
VC PW 5

Wpnns GIA - 2 AK-47, 1 B-40, 1 M13-43 RPG,
1 Chinese 7.62mm pistol, 2 SKS,
1 M-1
VCI KIA 3
VCI GIA 9
Koi Chanh 7
Misc - 1 B-40 (dust), 8 B-40 rds, 19 Chinese Grenades,
1 US claymore, 4 US steel pots, 1 Chinese flag,
13 rucksacks, 2,300 lbs of rice, 67 lbs of documents.

13. Administrative Matters:

a. Logistics:

(1) While TF 3-506 Companies were operating on pacification operations the resupply cycle of three days normally consisted of the following items:

5	claymore mines
6	fragmentation grenades
12	smk grenades
500	rounds 5.56mm ammunition
1000	rounds 7.62mm ammunition
30	hand flares
2	cases M-79 ammunition

(2) The four 82mm mortar tubes in support of Tan Lang (V) and Tay Hoa (V) areas consisted of a basic load as follows:

150 rounds HE
125 rounds illumination
50 rounds WP

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Subject: Current Operation After RVN/MIA Report

Expenditure of China mortar ammunition during Phase I pacification operations was as follows:

2,437 rounds HE
676 rounds illumination
125 rounds WP

(3) RVN D-506 supported the 300, 164 and 263 PF Companies on a regular basis. Normal resupply for these elements through Vietnamese channels was totally insufficient and rendered them practically incapable of fulfilling their mission. Once construction had been completed on hamlet defenses, supplies such as munitions, claymore mines, grenades, were furnished to the defending units. Total supplies furnished those PF and PT elements during Phase I of pacification operations were as follows:

190 claymore mines
10 c. sec M-79 ammunition
4 cases .30 cal ammunition
700 fragmentation grenades
50 five gallon water jugs
30 rolls of concertina wire
5 rolls of barbed wire
40 pickets
600 cantons
9,700 sandbags

b. Medical:

Medical missions were conducted in conjunction with certain operations and occasionally at other times in the target hamlets. Treatment of hamlet residents was conducted on a daily basis by the medics assigned to each of the Companies. Supply operations continued in support of PF and PT elements, as well as civilians, injured by VC terrorists. These VN personnel were extended the same considerations and afforded the same response as that received by US forces.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques: Not applicable15. Commanders Analysis:

a. The pairing off of RF units with our Companies is the only way that the RF will be upgraded and upheld overtime.

(1) While the Province Chief gave the District Chief the direction of pacifying and assigned 5 Companies to the task, he placed additional missions on the tasked units making them ineffective for pacification and clearing, static defense of outposts. Therefore, only 2 platoons of each company were actually committed during Phase I.

b. Checkerboarding the hamlet at night with RF can be extremely effective. This method divides the hamlet into sectors for 3 men with claymores and grenades and small arms. Once in position they absolutely do not move. Since a curfew has been imposed, the men in each "square" shoot at anything in their square. This can be successfully done with strict discipline by the soldiers and eliminates small group infiltration.

c. A greater need for interpreters exists and must be available especially when American forces are working with RF platoons.

d. MIL teams must also accompany each paired-off RF Company for daily coordination of operations and site selection of ambush positions.

16. Recommendations Formed/Possible Areas:

a. District Chiefs should be allocated, directly under his control, necessary forces to accomplish his mission in direct proportion to the population within his District and the strength of enemy forces operating.

CONFIDENTIAL**a. Artillery: Current Operation After LOWEST Report**

Expenditure of gun mortar ammunition during Phase II pacification operations was as follows:

2,437 rounds HE
634 rounds illumination
113 rounds AP

(2) RV P-506 supported the 300, 164 and 263 RF Companies in a major battle. Normal resupply for these elements through Vietnamese channels was totally insufficient and rendered them practically incapable of fulfilling their mission. Once construction had been completed on border defences, supplies such as munitions, claymore mines, grenades, were furnished to the defending units. Total supplies furnished these RF and PF elements during Phase I of pacification operations were as follows:

100 claymore mines
10 cases M-79 ammunition
6 cases .30 cal ammunition
700 fragmentation grenades
50 five gallon water jugs
30 rolls of concertina wire
5 rolls of barbed wire
10 pickets
600 canteens
9,700 sandbags

b. Medical:

Medical missions were conducted in conjunction with certain operations and occasionally at other times in the target hamlets. Treatment of hamlet residents was conducted on a daily basis by the medics assigned to each of the Companies. Sustoff operations continued in every 1% of RF and PF elements, as well as civilians, injured by VC terrorists. These VN personnel were extended the same considerations and offered the same response as that received by US forces.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques: Not applicable**15. Counterinsurgency:**

a. The pairing off of RF units with our Companies is the only way that the RF will be upgraded and supported and should continue.

(1) While the Province Chief gave the District Chief the mission of pacifying and assigned 5 Companies to the task, he placed additional missions on the tasked units making them ineffective for pacification and clearing, static defense of outposts. Therefore, only 3 platoons of each company were actually committed during Phase I.

b. Checkerboarding the hamlet at night with RF can be extremely effective. This method divides the hamlet into sectors for 3 men with claymores and grenades and small arms. Once in position they absolutely do not move. Since a comr. has been injured, the men in each "square" shoot at anything in their square. This can be successfully done with strict discipline by the soldiers and eliminates small group infiltration.

c. A greater need for interpreters exists and must be available immediately when American squads are working with RF platoons.

d. NCO teams must also accompany each paired-off RF Company for initial orientation of operations and site selection of ambush positions.

16. Recommendation: Lowest/Mullen Report

a. District Chiefs should be selected, directly under his control, necessary forces to accomplish his mission in direct proportion to the population within his District and the strength of enemy forces operating

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A/EX-AF-6

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

ing in the District. Such action would cause immediate reaction to enemy initiated incidents and would permit the establishment of a cordon around a target area as it developed.

b. It was noted that when provided the proper support, RF forces would actively engage the enemy and participate in virtually any mission. The RF elements, however, still require training and/or accompanied by US forces. It is recommended that combined operations between RF and PF elements be initiated by breaking down RF elements to operate in ambush positions in the vicinity of their hamlets as well as the concept of nightly patrolling within the hamlet. Initially this combined operation should be accompanied and supervised by US elements which could be withdrawn.

c. On May 8 1969, as the cordon around Tuy Hoa (V) was being withdrawn and continued ambush operations were about to be initiated, it was anticipated that construction of the defensive positions within the village would commence. The CO, TF 3-506 was informed by the SA, Binh Thuan Province, after inquiring as to the defensive plan for Tuy Hoa (V), that there was no plan in existence at that time. It would have been more effective if concrete results could have been demonstrated to the populace of Tuy Hoa (V) immediately. Before such operations commence, detailed plans for each step of the entire operation should be formulated.

d. Initially, great difficulty was encountered in the positioning of the RF elements. The concept of static defensive positions outside the hamlet actually resulted in RF supporting and protecting themselves rather than the people. Once the RF move into an area, pacification is worthless unless the people can be protected. Compounds should be constructed so as to be contiguous with the hamlet or village. In addition, ambush position on the periphery of the hamlet should be employed as well as patrols through the hamlet which do not follow a pattern. Roving ambushes, using three or four different locations within the hamlet each night without establishing a pattern should also be used.

e. Difficulty was also encountered in obtaining the nightly ambush locations of separate Vietnamese elements on a timely basis. District Advisors must impress upon District Officials the necessity of acquiring these locations as soon as possible. In addition, these locations must be accurate. District Officials must insure that separate Vietnamese elements are in positions that have been pre-planned.

f. The most difficult problem encountered by TF 3-506 during pacification and pair-off operations was that of communications. Interactions are an absolute necessity, especially when squad size ambush operations are conducted with RF/PF units. Due to the size of a combined squad ambush position it is imperative that each individual be aware of the mission and location of his element as well as other ambush locations. Also each individual must be able to talk to members of his ambush in case of separation or contact with the enemy. The problem of communication also extends to the need of sufficient radios to support numerous ambush locations.

g. Without adequate support the RF/PF cannot function. These 2 pacification efforts were hampered and delayed by the lack of equipment supplied by Province to the District. In addition, supplies that were supposed to have been put aside for the target hamlets and villages to be used when required for the construction of defensive positions within and/or the hamlets were reportedly non-existent. Those supplies which eventually made their way down to the individual RF/PF soldier in the rural areas were minimal. It should be noted that while supplies

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were non-existent for the villages of Tan Hung, Tuy Hoa and Hoa Vinh which total a population of 2200, the construction of a wire barb barricade has been started around the western portion of the city of Phan Thiet.

FOR THE COMMANDER

John V. Gallucci
JOHN V. GALLUCCI
Major, Infantry
S-3

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